![]() It has the typical form of induction, and its conclusion directly contradicts ScR. ![]() PMI was famously formulated by Poincaré (1902, 160) and Putnam (1978, 25). The former, which more properly deserves that name, is: PMI (I) most past successful theories were radically false (II) there is no radical (epistemic, methodological, etc.) difference between past and present theories therefore, by induction (III) also current and future successful theories are and will most likely be radically false therefore (IV) there is no compelling reason to believe that theories are true (in fact, there are reasons to believe that they are mostly radically false). They move from a similar premise and are strictly connected, so that many confuse them under the name of " pessimistic meta-induction " 1 but they are distinct and have different conclusions. ScR is notoriously supported by the " no miracle " argument (NMA): NMA (α) some theories are successful (β) the best or only explanation of success is truth, therefore (γ) successful theories are most probably true therefore (δ) there can be compelling reason to believe that theories are true (ScR) But there are two important arguments against realism from the failures of past science. Two Pessimistic Arguments against Realism and Two Defence Strategies We can broadly understand Scientific Realism (ScR) (as opposed to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism) as the claim that there can be compelling reasons to believe in the at least partial and/or approximate truth of scientific theories.
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